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From the 1970s on, banking supervision grew in size and importance. Which were the 
characteristics of the regulatory elite leading this developing activity? Based on archival 
material from central banks and supervisory institutions and on a collective biography analysis, 
this chapter explores the profile of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision members, 
their role in the construction of an international regulatory institution, and some of their first 
achievements. It shows that some Basel Committee members were well involved in 
transnational networks of governance, others used their experience as banking supervisor in the 
private sector, while still others had a more national-centred career and stayed in the central 
banking or banking supervision sector. The Basel Committee members were the elite of banking 
supervisors. Over time, their committee evolved from a club to a standard-setter institution, 
illustrating the newly acquired influence both of banking supervision and experts and expertise 
in international financial governance.   
Key words: banking supervision, Basel Committee, collective biography, expertise, 
international institution, financial governance. 
 
 
The end of 20th Century came with an increased role of expertise in both banking and 
banking regulation. New methods were devised in order to control better more internationalised 
and more complex banking practices. Who were the people in charge of establishing these new 
supervisory practices? The Basel Committee on Banking Regulation and Supervisory Practices 
(hereafter BCBS), established in late 1974 after a series of banking failures in Germany, the 
United Kingdom and the United States, was part of the reaction of the G10 central bank 
governors to the challenges of the post-Bretton Woods era.1 They asked a group of senior 
officers in banking supervision to help them in their task of monitoring the international 
financial system. These supervisors became active first in the exchange of ideas to improve the 
control of international banking, and then in the production of common international standards 
in banking supervision. Varied networks were established and developed to support this process 
which both transformed the Committee into an institution in itself and contributed to the 
internationalisation of national supervisory institutions.  
Banking supervisors have a complex relationship with banks. They have daily contacts 
with bankers and in some cases are former bankers themselves, or have had a career in the 
private sector after experience in banking supervision. On the other hand, supervisors belong 
to the authorities, whether they come from central banks as in the United Kingdom, or from 
                                                          
1 Catherine Schenk, ‘Summer in the City: Banking Failures of 1974 and the Development of International 
Banking Supervision’, The English Historical Review 2014 (129:540): 1129-1156. 
other separate institutions as in Germany. If they are now at the centre of interest in the field of 
banking regulation,2 this was certainly not the case in the early 1970s. At that time, banking 
supervision differed radically from one country to another, and was linked to differences in the 
relationship between the State and the market within the Group of Ten.  
The BCBS was a group of senior officers of banking supervision and foreign exchanges 
from 12 different countries (the G10 plus Luxembourg and Switzerland). They had real 
authority at home but played the role of experts for the central banks’ governors when sitting 
on the Committee. In this capacity, they participated in the production of a new, more 
internationalised market. This chapter, then, examines the characteristics and role of this group 
of senior officers in the establishment of a new institution, their relationships with banks, and 
their role in the shaping of a new post-Bretton Woods international financial market, between 
its creation in 1974 and its first agreement on a capital adequacy standard in 1988. More 
generally, it sheds light on the role of experts as historical actors in the field of financial 
regulation. It will examine the group of people who comprised the BCBS, the institutional 
evolution of the Committee between 1975 and 1988, and its influence within the field of 
regulation and supervisory practices.  
This chapter states that the power of the Basel Committee members had various 
dimensions. On an individual basis, many members exerted influence. As a group, they were 
the only ones who could devise the rules for international banking supervision. As an institution, 
the BCBS acquired over time a legitimacy that gave it strong political power. Members of the 
Committee were empowered by their membership; a membership which placed them as key 
actors in the world of financial regulation. If they were not as powerful as central bank 
governors, their influence became undeniable, and as such they were part of the elite. The power 
of the BCBS was further reinforced by the fact that it favoured the development of a more 
unified profession of banking supervisors, and by the increased role of technocracy and 
expertise in financial regulation in the 1970s and 1980s. The relation between power and elites 
has been stressed by Scott, a point that helps him distinguish elite from class.3 Another approach 
is provided by Bourdieu and his followers, who stress the importance of various kinds of capital 
(economic, symbolic, social, cultural) in differentiating between types of elites, and the 
interrelations between structures and individuals.4 This approach has been used to address 
topics, such as central bankers from a comparative perspective,5 or the characteristics of the 
elites of globalisation.6  
In this chapter, both perspectives will be taken into consideration. If Basel Committee 
members cannot be considered as representative of a “class”, their sociological properties 
                                                          
2 Gianni Toniolo and Eugene N. White, ‘The Evolution of the Financial Stability Mandate: From Its Origins to the 
Present Day’, National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper 2015 (n° 20844). 
3 John Scott, ‘Modes of power and the re‐conceptualization of elites’, The Sociological Review 2008 (56:1): 25-
43. 
4 Pierre Bourdieu, Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique, précédé de trois études d’ethnologie kabyle, (Paris, 
2000) ; Pierre Bourdieu, La Distinction. Critique sociale du jugement, (Paris, 1979). 
5 Frédéric Lebaron, ‘European Central Bank leaders in the global space of central bankers: A Geometric Data 
Analysis approach’, French Politics 2010 (8:3): 294-320. 
6 Anne-Catherine Wagner, ‘Les élites managériales de la mondialisation : angles d'approche et catégories 
d'analyse’, Entreprises et histoire 2005 (41:4): 15-23 ; Yves Dezalay, ‘Les courtiers de l'international’, Actes de la 
Recherche en Sciences Sociales 2004 (151-152: 1): 4-35. 
provide us with important insights on the middle ranking elite of globalisation and on its 
diversity. The bourdieusian approach also stresses the resilience of national structures in the 
financial elites’ profile, in spite of globalisation forces. On the other hand, the increasing 
influence of the Basel Committee mirrors the growing power of a profession, that of banking 
supervisor, and the escalating importance of an activity, banking regulation, in the financial 
sector, at the end of the 20th century. Therefore one can consider that a new type of financial 
regulatory elite emerged at that time, whose Basel Committee and its members were part: 
experts and senior officers in banking supervision and regulation. The growing field of banking 
regulation and supervision reflect the mutually reinforcing interaction of legal and financial 
elites stressed in the chapter by Arvind, Gray and Wilson. The newly acquired influence of 
regulatory and supervisory experts in international financial governance made them part of the 
elite in the sense of Scott.  
The Basel Committee is at the crossroads of various academic concerns. It has already 
been widely studied by political scientists and economists.7 Much less attention has been given 
to its members, however. Only Goodhart provides some biographical information, but only on 
important members.8 More generally, central bank cooperation, the Bank for International 
Settlements (hereafter BIS), and their role in preserving financial stability,9 as well as the 
internationalisation of the central banks,10 have also been studied. Others have studied experts 
and expert committees and their role played in international financial and monetary 
governance.11 The approach used here considers that inquiring into people's characteristics is 
important in order to highlight the social dimension of power in the field of financial regulation. 
It also helps to better understand the process of regulation, and not only the results. Furthermore, 
the BCBS can be seen as having played a role in the shaping of a new international banking 
field; that is, a social space with its own rules and where members compete for a specific goal.12  
Newly available archival material from central banks and the BIS, as well as collective 
biographies of BCBS members, shed light on the role played by elites and institutions in the 
shaping of the post-Bretton Woods international financial system. Networks of technocrats and 
experts developed new tools to foster monetary and financial stability. Archival material helps 
clarify the political, institutional and economic stakes. Biographies highlight connections 
                                                          
7 Ethan B. Kapstein, Governing the Global Economy: international finance and the state (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts ; London, 1994) ; Duncan R. Wood, Governing global banking: the Basel Committee and the 
politics of financial globalisation (Aldershot, 2005) ; David A. Singer, Regulating capital: setting standards for 
the international financial system, (Ithaca, 2010) ; Charles A. E. Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision : a history of the early years, 1974-1997 (Cambridge ; New York ; Melbourne, 2011). 
8 Goodhart, The Basel Committee. 
9 Gianni Toniolo, Central bank cooperation at the Bank for International Settlements, 1930-1973 (New York, 
2005) ; Kazuhiko Yago, The financial history of the Bank for International Settlements (London ; New York, 2012) 
; Toniolo and White, ‘The Evolution of the Financial Stability Mandate’. 
10 Olivier Feiertag and Michel Margairaz, eds, Les Banques centrales à l’échelle du monde, L’internationalisation 
des banques centrales des débuts du XXe siècle à nos jours, (Paris, 2012); John Singleton, Central Banking in the 
Twentieth Century (Cambridge; New York, 2011). 
11 Robert Raymond, 'Le Rôle des Comités d’experts du Comité des Gouverneurs des Banques Centrales de la 
CEE', Histoire, Économie & Société 2011 (30:4): 101-105 ; Amy Verdun, 'The Role of the Delors Committee in 
the Creation of EMU: an Epistemic Community?', Journal of European Public Policy 1999 (6:2): 308–28 ; Ivo 
Maes, 'Alexandre Lamfalussy et les tentatives de la BRI pour éviter un endettement excessif en Amérique latine 
dans les années 1970', Histoire, économie & société 2011 (30:4): 59–77. 
12 Pierre Bourdieu, 'Le Champ Économique', Actes de la Recherche en Sciences Sociales 1997 (119:1): 48–66. 
between the banking sector and the regulatory sector, career profiles of the BCBS members, 
and the kind of expertise on which their authority was based.  
 
1. Collective biography analysis 
If we follow the results of Goodhart's study, 127 people attended the Basel Committee 
between its first meeting in January 1975 and the last meeting of the year 1987, not counting 
those occasional members such as delegates from the European Commission. These 127 people 
included 120 national delegates and seven members from the BIS. Important variations existed 
between the representation of one country and another, because of the different turnover among 
delegates. For instance, four Canadian delegates came to the Committee during the period under 
study, but there were 22 from the United States and from Japan. 50 biographies (39.4%) have 
been found through various sources, such as the central banks websites, online obituaries, 
archival material, specialised websites or publications.13 The main characteristics of these 50 
members are indicated in Appendix 1. Unfortunately, these biographies do not cover member 
countries equally. For example, all the French delegates have been found, but almost no 
Japanese. Several other biases characterise this sample. For example, some members attended 
only one session whereas others attended more than 50. Also, the biographical information 
found is not exactly identical from one person to another, and not always complete. Finally, the 
more high-ranking a member became during his life, the easier it is to find his biography. 
Therefore information found may not be representative, particularly when it is found online or 
in publications such as the Who’s who. However, these biographies do help to assess the 
heterogeneity or homogeneity of the group, and understand better what kind of people sat on 
the Committee. Half the BCBS members were coming from supervisory departments in central 
banks or from supervisory institutions where there was one, and half from central banks' foreign 
exchange departments. Each country was supposed to send two delegates for each meeting, 
although on occasion some countries, such as the United States, sent more delegates. 
A first distinctive feature of the members of the Committee is their diversity, between 
one country and another, but also within one and the same country. This variety stemmed both 
from national differences and from the fact that members were middle ranking elites, as 
opposed to central bank governors who represented the top level of each country's central 
banking profile.14 In the French case, no delegate was a former Inspector of Finance, which was 
the traditional elite profile of the financial elite in France. Among the nine British delegates on 
which information is known for a total of 11 people over the period, four were Oxbridge 
graduates, among whom were the two chairs, George Blunden and Peter Cooke. Two British 
secretaries of the Committee, both from the Bank of England, attended the elitist public school, 
Eton. Out of five American delegates whose education is known, two were Harvard graduates. 
Three of the six known Swiss members were lawyers. Some members thus had a rather typical 
                                                          
13 Elizabeth Hennessy, Who’s Who in Central Banking, (London, 1997) ; Elizabeth Hennessy and Carola Gebhard, 
Who’s Who in Financial Regulation, (London, 1998). 
14 Youssef Cassis, 'La Communauté des Gouverneurs des Banques Centrales Européennes depuis la fin de la 
Seconde Guerre mondiale', Olivier Feiertag and Michel Margairaz, eds, Politiques et Pratiques des Banques 
d’émission en Europe (XVIIe-XXe Siècle). Le Bicentenaire de la Banque de France dans la Perspective de l’Identité 
Monétaire Européenne, (Paris, 2003), 753–65. 
elitist profile of each country in terms of their education and earlier profession, but by no means 
all of them.  
All members of the BCBS were senior officers in their home institution. However, while 
it is difficult to compare seniority from one country to another, it seems that some countries 
sent people who were more senior than others. For instance, in the case of the United States, 
David Willey was vice president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York when he attended 
the Committee. Heimann and Bench were both Comptroller of the Currency, a position at the 
head of one of the three US regulatory institutions. On the other hand, the French delegates 
seemed to be slightly less senior. They usually ranked just below the head of the Banks' Control 
Commission, which was itself subordinated to the central bank. This was the case for Pierre 
Fanet and Jean Bonnardin, who held positions just below that of the secretary general of the 
Commission. In the Japanese case, career progression was linked to the frequency of transfers 
from one position to another at the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, there 
was a rapid turnover of Japanese delegates.15 Another G10-based committee, the Euro-currency 
Standing Committee was composed of more senior members than those in the BCBS, yet no 
hierarchical difference was ever expressed.  
As an expert committee, the BCBS worked for the central bank’s governors but still 
enjoyed relative independence. This was for two reasons: firstly, their expertise in banking 
practices and banking supervision and regulation gave them technical power, and secondly, 
some of the delegates were not coming from central banks but from other institutions : the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (from 1978 onwards) and the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (from 1984 onwards) in the USA; the Ministry of Finance in Japan; the 
Federal Office of Supervision in Germany, and the Federal Banking Commission in 
Switzerland, for instance. Rivalries between these institutions and the central bank of these 
countries could be important. Several authors states that governors did not intervene much in 
the affairs of the Committee, partly because banking supervision was an esoteric topic.16 
However, governors did brief members at home and exerted considerable pressure on the capital 
convergence exercise which started in 1984. Governors' involvement depended on the kind of 
topic discussed and its policy implications, but in any case they could not write the reports on 
their own, and needed BCBS members to do so.   
Almost all the members of the Committee were males, which reflected the 
predominantly male environment of central banking. Among the attendees only one was a 
woman: Mrs. Lepoivre, from the National Bank of Belgium. According to Goodhart, she 
attended 33 meetings between 1984 and 1995.17 Male predominance was particularly visible 
during international conferences or special meetings organised outside Basel, during which 
spouses were invited. This was the case for instance of a joint meeting of the Groupe de Contact 
and a working group of the Basel Committee in Copenhagen in May 1984,18 or at the 
                                                          
15 Satoshi Watanabe, The Origin and Development of International Cooperation for Financial Stability - 
International Cooperation at the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision [translation from Japanese] (Tokyo, 
2012). 
16 Richard J. Herring and Robert E. Litan, Financial Regulation in a Global Economy, (Washington, D.C, 1994); 
Goodhart, The Basel Committee. 
17 Goodhart, The Basel Committee. 
18 Bank of France Archives (hereafter BoF), 1749200912/263, Meeting of the Groupe de Contact in Copenhagen 
on 24 and 25 May 1984, « Ladies programme ». 
international conference of banking supervisors in Tokyo in October 1988:19 these events had 
a specific program for spouses which included visits and shopping, in addition to common 
sociability practices such as buffets and dinners. These events thus illustrated a strong sexual 
division of roles in the society.  
Was the BCBS a group of new transnational elites? The answer depends from one 
member to another, and within one and the same country. Even if many members had had an 
international experience, most of them had spent much of their career in their home country. 
Out of 50 people whose biographies have been found, 24 have had an international experience 
of one year or more in their career, or have been involved in several international groupings 
other than the BCBS. For example Gérard Aubanel, one of the first French delegates, was sent 
to the IMF between 1955 and 1958, and then to the European Commission between 1962 and 
1963. Derrick Byatt, from the Bank of England, went to the BIS for fifteenth months in 1955 
and 1956. Motomichi Ikawa was an economist at the OECD between 1976 and 1979 before 
representing the Japanese Ministry of Finance on the Basel Committee, from 1982 on. 
However, some members have been more particularly involved in international activities during 
their career. This is the case for example of Albert Dondelinger, a delegate from Luxembourg 
at the Basel Committee. He was part of many other committees and institutions, such as the 
EEC committee of banking supervisors, known as the “Groupe de Contact”, the World Bank, 
the monetary committee of the EEC (between 1971 and 1976), and the interim committee of 
the IMF (between 1972 and 1976). John Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency and member 
of the Basel Committee between 1978 and 1980, was member and treasurer of the Group of 
Thirty and a president of the American Ditchley foundation, among many other international 
groupings. Overall some members did have a very international profile and belonged to a vast 
network of committees and institutions, while others had a more domestic-centred career. 
A comparison between British and French members sheds light on national differences 
concerning international profiles. There were seven French delegates and 10 British delegates 
(excluding chairmen and secretaries) attending the Basel Committee between 1975 and 1987. 
Biographies of all the French members and of eight British members have been found. Of these 
eight British, three had an experience in the former or then current British empire: Derrick Byatt 
was seconded to the central bank of Zambia, and David Nendick to the central bank of Mauritius 
before going to work for the Hong Kong government to which Richard Farrant was also 
assigned. Conversely, most French delegates spent their career at the Bank of France or at the 
Banks' Control Commission. Some of them, however, did have a relatively extensive 
experience abroad, in Europe. For example, André Icard, member of the Basel Committee 
between 1982 and 1984, was deputy director-general of the BIS between 1996 and 2000, while 
Jean-Pierre Fèvre was seconded to the European Commission between 1989 and 1997 before 
going back to the Bank of France. 
Were there bankers on the Committee? This question relates to the more general issue 
of the relationships the BCBS had with commercial banks. Goodhart states that there were few 
direct contacts between the BCBS and banks, because most of these contacts were established 
at a national level.20 While being true on the whole, such a perspective establishes an artificial 
rupture between the BCBS and national authorities represented on the Committee. In addition, 
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20 Goodhart, The Basel Committee. 
several members were indeed bankers themselves, before or after their time on the Committee. 
Of the 50 people whose biography has been found, 13 had had some experience in the private 
sector. This experience ranged from consulting activities, sometimes after retirement, to an 
almost life-time career as a banker. National variations were, here again, very important. 
Frederik Mush, a Dutch delegate between 1982 and 1992, had various positions in an 
investment bank and at PriceWaterHouseCoopers before and after his experience at the 
Nederlandsche Bank. Two Swiss members, out of a total of six biographies collected (and a 
total of 10 Swiss members between 1975 and 1987), ended their career in the private sector. 
This is also the case for two British members out of a total of seven biographies collected from 
a total of 10 British members over the same period (excluding chairmen and secretaries). 
Additionally, Dondelinger (Luxembourg) was chairman of the Luxembourgian Banks and 
Bankers' Association between 1977 and 1978, member of the Overseas Bankers Club of 
London and fellow of the International Bankers Association in Washington. French members 
had particularly little experiences in the private sector, whether before or after their time on the 
Committee. Only André Icard, one of the seven French delegates between 1975 and 1987 (for 
whom all the biographies have been found), has been administrator at the Banque Française du 
Commerce Extérieur, established in 1946 to develop French exports, and closely linked to the 
French state.  
American members seem to have had closer links with commercial banks or other 
private institutions, although information is missing. Four US members out of a total of seven 
biographies found (and a total of 22 people between 1975 and 1987) had experience in the 
private sector. David Willey, vice-president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New-York, worked 
at Morgan Stanley, while Robert Bench joined Price Waterhouse after 22 years spent at the 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency. John Heimann worked at Smith Barney & Co and 
E.M. Warburg Pincus & Co for about twenty years before becoming Comptroller of the 
Currency in 1977, until 1981. He returned to the private sector from 1982 onwards, working 
first at Becker Paribas Incorporated, then at Merill Lynch, where he became chairman of Global 
Financial Institutions in 1991. In the same vein, Michael Patriarca spent most of his career in 
the private sector. US supervisors were more attracted to the private sector than in other 
countries, most notably France, a result that is confirmed by archival material.21 These results 
hint that individual members' profiles reflected the overall relationship between the state and 
the market in each country. 
What kind of expertise did the members have? If education gives insights into this 
question, it is also to be looked at carefully, as in some cases it could reflect a way of selecting 
the elite of a country. Two disciplines dominate the 34 cases whose educational background is 
known: law and economics. This reflects the different skill profiles of supervisors and central 
bankers already identified by Goodhart.22 22 members out of 34 had studied law during their 
education, 20 members had studied economics. In addition, two French members had attended 
the Institut d'Etudes Politiques of Paris which could include a training in economics. Only three 
                                                          
21 US National Archives and Records Administration (hereafter NARA), 101820027/20, “Human resources issues 
for discussion by the Comptroller,” 15th July 1977. 
22Charles A. E. Goodhart, Dirk Schoenmaker, and Paolo Dasgupta, 'The Skill Profile of Central Bankers and 
Supervisors', European Finance Review 2002 (6:3): 397-427.  
members had a proven PhD in economics. Helmut Mayer, secretary of the Committee and 
expert in euro-markets at the BIS had a PhD from Stanford. David Willey, from the Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York and member of the Committee between 1975 and 1982, had a PhD 
in economics from the University of Columbia. Motomichi Ikawa, from the Ministry of Finance 
and on the Committee between 1982 and 1984, had a PhD from Berkeley. Some members, such 
as Brian Quinn or Richard Farrant (Bank of England) had been economists at the IMF, but 
precise information on their education has not been ascertained. Gemmill from the Federal 
Reserve had a PhD from Harvard University, but the discipline has not been been found, 
although economics is a most likely possibility. Law was particularly important in Switzerland 
(five out of the six members whose education is known had studied law, for a total of ten 
members over the period considered). Of the 34 cases known, seven members had studied both 
law and economics. The predominance of these two disciplines reflects the point stressed in the 
chapter by Wendschlag about the central bank elites’ education from 1950 to 2000, although 
the shorter time frame considered here does not allow to identify the rise of economics.  
However, education was not the main source of expertise. There were relatively few 
members with a PhD, and professional experience and training within a home institution was 
important. Other fields of expertise such as accounting were also deemed important in the 
profession. Furthermore, knowledge of the market was a key element of members' skill profiles, 
and formed a sort of “tacit knowledge”, that is, a little formalised knowledge playing an 
important role in the exercising of their authority.23 There was, however, no specific training in 
banking supervision at that time. To some extent the work of the BCBS was to produce a more 
formalised knowledge on banking supervision at the international level. Therefore, members' 
expertise was first and foremost based on their professional experience and authority.  
The Basel Committee was well connected to a network of other committees and various 
institutions. It was in itself a network connecting central banks and supervisory institutions.24 
As Goodhart explains, connections were particularly important with EEC groupings, 
particularly the Groupe de Contact and the Banking Advisory Committee of the EEC.25 There 
was an important membership overlap between these two committees, both involved in banking 
regulation and supervision, and the BCBS. At least seven European members of the Basel 
Committee were also part of the Groupe de Contact, although not necessarily concurrently: 
Schmit (Luxembourg), Dondelinger (Luxembourg), Muller (Netherlands), Schneider 
(Germany), Baeyens (Beglium), Bonnardin (France), Coljé (Netherlands). Schneider became 
chairman of the Groupe de Contact in 1982,26 and Bonnardin was chairman before him.27 
Furthermore, at least eight European members of the Basel Committee have been part of the 
Banking Advisory Committee: Muller (Netherlands), Musch (Netherlands), Schaus 
(Luxembourg), Farrant (United Kingdom), Schneider (Germany), Coljé (Netherlands), Lang 
(Germany), Cooke (United Kingdom).28 Some members have thus been part of all three 
                                                          
23 Michael Polanyi, The Tacit Dimension, (Chicago, 2009). 
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Jacob Torfing, eds, Democratic Network Governance in Europe, (Basingstoke ; New York, 2007), 214–232. 
25 Goodhart, The Basel Committee. 
26 BoF, 1749200912/305, Twenty-fourth meeting, 25th and 26th February 1982. 
27 Bank for International Settlements Archives (hereafter BISA), 1.3a(3) F, Seventeenth meeting, 8th and 9th 
November 1979. 
28 Hennessy, Who’s who in central banking ; Hennessy and Gebhard, Who’s who in financial regulation ; BoF, 
1749200912/265, “List of members of the Banking Advisory Committee”, June 1986 ; 
www3.tcmb.gov.tr/conference/cv/MuschCV.pdf [consulted on 5th May 2015]. 
committees, though not always exactly at the same time. As a result, European members were 
particularly well involved in international networks of banking regulation, because of the 
European integration process.  
Several members were also part of other transnational committees. The Euro-currency 
Standing Committee (hereafter ECSC) of the BIS, another G10-based expert committee 
working for the central bank governors, was working on international financial activities from 
a macro-economic perspective. Both committees had had tense relationships at the turn of the 
1980s because they worked on similar issues from a different perspective. Peter Cooke, 
chairman of the BCBS, represented the Basel Committee at the ECSC's meetings from 1980 
on. Musch, a Dutch delegate at the BCBS between 1982 and 1992 was also a member of the 
ECSC, although the time of his membership is not known, and André, from the National Bank 
of Belgium, was probably a member of the ECSC for about ten years.29 Musch and Mayer 
(secretary of the BCBS, BIS) participated respectively to a committee on financial services and 
to a working group on banking regulation at the OECD.30 Gutzwiller, a delegate from 
Switzerland, was member of the monetary law committee of the International Law Association 
while also being a member of the BCBS. In 1981, Peter Cooke participated in the sub-group of 
the Group of Thirty working on the question of international banking risk and supervision.31 
Some members were also part of various clubs such as the Rotary Club (Dondelinger,32 
Luxembourg; Hauri,33 Switzerland), the Ditchley Foundation (Heimann, USA), and the City of 
London Club (Barnes, United Kingdom). Furthermore, some members participated in various 
groupings established by the BCBS itself together with other institutions: Willey (USA), Kloft 
(Germany), Dealtry (BIS, secretary of the Committee), Stahel (Switzerland), and Timmerman 
(Netherlands) were part of a joint working group with the Banking Commission of the 
International Chamber of Commerce.34 Vachon (Canada), Pille (Belgium), Timmerman 
(Netherlands), Aubanel (France), Lanciotti (Italy), Dealtry (BIS), formed a BIS group with 
other national delegates working on international maturity transformation.35  
At national level, members were part of various committees and working groups, 
ensuring a connection with the international level. Bodmer, a Swiss delegate, was part of an 
expert group working on a report to the government on the improvement of the prudential 
system.36 Danielsson, from Sweden, was part of a committee examining banks' capital adequacy 
rules from 1976 on.37 Müller (Switzerland) was part of a special commission created by the 
Swiss government to revise the banking law in 1977.38 Fèvre, Fanet and Bonnardin (France) 
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were all part of the working group working for a new 'Plan Comptable' (accounting rules) 
between 1973 and 1976.39 Heimann, Comptroller of the Currency between 1977 and 1981 and 
member of the Committee between 1978 and 1980, was the first chairman of the Federal Bank 
Examination Council, representing the three US federal regulatory institutions.40 Wiley and 
Gemmill, US delegates, were both part of the System Steering Committee on International 
Banking Regulation established in early 1973 by the Federal Reserve.41 The Basel Committee 
was thus well integrated in a national and international network of committees  
The BCBS was a heterogeneous network of senior officers who were differently 
connected to the private sector, and to international governance structures, even within one and 
the same country. However, some differences can be identified between countries: for instance, 
American members had closer links with commercial banks than French members. In addition, 
educational background reflects each country’s traditions, a point also stressed in the chapter 
by Wendschlag on central bank elites. Lastly, a majority of members had a rather “national” 
career, despite their participation to the Basel Committee. Some members were already 
influential on an individual basis. This was particularly the case of the two chairmen, George 
Blunden and Peter Cooke, but also of several American members such as John Heimann. Over 
the period 1975-1988 the evolution of the international context gave the BCBS a status which 
enabled it to shape the new international financial system of the late 20th Century.  
 
 
2. From a club to an institution 
The Basel Committee had first a club-like dimension and was supposed to bring together 
people who did not know each other very well. The objective was certainly not to harmonise 
banking regulations or supervisory practices, but to learn from each other, exchange ideas and 
share information.42 This club-like dimension was maintained throughout the entire period: 
with dinners hosted by the chairman, meetings arranged outside Basel, and international 
conferences occurring every two years, all organised to foster trust and mutual understanding. 
Increasing international competition and risks in the international financial system placed the 
Committee in a key position within banking regulation. Over time, it gained a public authority 
that enabled it to issue common standards. This authority was reinforced by a context favouring 
more liberalised but more controlled international banking practices, thus empowering banking 
supervision in general. In close contact with bankers and various kinds of international experts, 
BCBS members helped shape a new international financial system.  
From 1979 on, the BCBS organised international conferences of banking supervisors 
gathering professionals from all over the world. Five conferences were organised between 1979 
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and 1988, in London, Washington, Rome, Amsterdam and Tokyo. They soon acquired a role 
of circulating papers produced by the BCBS and obtaining endorsement on its proposed 
practices. They also reinforced a community feeling among supervisors. In October 1981, 
Cooke stated about these conferences that “he believed that there was merit in allowing as many 
supervisors as possible to feel part of a larger "family" from time to time”.43 Discussing the 
upcoming conference of 1988 in Tokyo after the Basel agreement on a common standard of 
capital adequacy, “Mr. Musch [Netherlands] said that the conferences provided an ideal 
opportunity to obtain the endorsement of non-G-10 countries to policies adopted by Committee 
members. He hoped it might be possible to secure broad international agreement on the capital 
framework”.44 These conferences usually gathered delegates from about a hundred countries 
over two days, and provided opportunities for developing and maintaining networks. High 
ranking officials such as central bank governors or Ministers of Finance made an opening 
speech. Some bankers were also invited, although not at the first conference.45 Such conferences 
therefore considerably increased the Committee's visibility and authority in the field of banking 
regulation.  
 From 1979 on, the BCBS played a role in establishing other regional groupings of 
banking supervisors. The first one was the offshore group of supervisors, whose idea dated back 
to the first conference of 1979 in London.46 It met several times with the BCBS or alone from 
1980 on. By 1985, there were also groups of supervisors from the Gulf countries, from Latin 
America and Caribbean, from South East Asia, New-Zealand and Australia (SEANZA).47 The 
BCBS, and first and foremost its chairman Peter Cooke, played a role in the establishment of 
these various groupings and members of the Committee attended their meetings. Thus the Basel 
Committee was soon at the centre of a network of banking supervisors’ regional groupings. The 
BCBS was not in itself the oldest international supervisors committee – the Nordic group and 
the EEC Groupe de Contact were already in existence when it was created – but its geographic 
coverage included the biggest banking systems, and therefore its authority was the strongest.  
The Committee itself changed between 1975 and 1988. Its second chairman, Peter 
Cooke, from June 1977 on,48 played an active role in promoting international banking 
supervision, whereas George Blunden, the former chairman, had been more conservative in his 
role.49 The International Debt Crisis of 1982 highlighted the risks of post-Bretton Woods 
international banking for the financial system taken as a whole. The failure of the BCBS to 
prevent this situation showed how difficult it was for authorities to control an international 
market due to strong accounting, legal and economic differences between countries. From 1984 
onwards, the BCBS came under strong political pressure as it became the key location for the 
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construction of an international agreement on capital adequacy for international banks. While 
the detailed story of the agreement is outside the scope of this paper, it is worth stressing how 
the capital convergence exercise changed the Committee. In 1984, at the initiative of Paul 
Volcker, chairman of the US Federal reserve, the Committee was given a new mandate to work 
more thoroughly on capital adequacy convergence between the G-10 countries.50 At the same 
time, it was decided to give more power to Peter Cooke, and to allow him to make 
recommendations which were based on the Committee's discussions, but did not necessarily 
have the support of all of its members. The secretariat of the Committee was reshaped in order 
to introduce more supervisory expertise and to help cope with its increasing technical work 
pressure. During the following years, it became clear that the BCBS would be a key institution 
in the process of capital adequacy convergence, even though some countries, particularly Japan, 
France and Germany, were opposed to the convergence exercise. As a result, by 1988, the 
Committee had gained an unprecedented role in the shaping of the international financial 
system.  
The BCBS also played a role in the construction of an international authority facing 
multinational banking. Supervisors need some respectability in the eyes of banks in order to 
carry out their activities. At a time where banks' multinationalisation and internationalisation 
was a serious challenge to national authorities, the Basel Committee was used to reinforce this 
authority. In December 1975, George Blunden (chairman, Bank of England) stated that “if any 
member of the Committee used decisions reached, or recommendations made, by the 
Committee as a means of strengthening his hand in discussions with his country's banks, the 
Committee must, in his view, accept that such an approach was perfectly legitimate”.51 Also 
part of the international construction of authority was the fact that members frequently 
circulated letters sent to their banks in order to discuss best practices and banks' reaction. For 
instance, at the June 1976 meeting, German delegates circulated papers sent by the Bundesbank 
and by the Federal Office of Supervision to other members to explain recent dispositions taken 
by German authorities in the field of internal audit requirement and foreign exchange 
transactions.52 Exchanging views and ideas about supervisory practices was also meant to 
reinforce supervisors' authority at home. In the same vein, at the June 1981 meeting, the Belgian 
delegate Pille said that the Committee's questionnaire inquiring on banks' evaluation of country 
risk “had been very useful in focusing the discussions the Banking Commission had had on this 
question with the Belgian banks, and the latter had expressed interest in the results of the 
Committee's exercise”.53 
Different representations of the role of supervisors existed, and discussions at the Basel 
Committee or during international conferences frequently initiated debates on the 
responsibilities and boundaries of the profession. For instance, the respective responsibilities 
of supervisors and bankers were difficult to delineate clearly. The discourses on the role of 
supervisors were often expressing a specific, market-oriented type of governance. For instance, 
Peter Cooke, chairman of the Committee, stated at the 5th International conference of banking 
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supervisors in 1988 that: “at the same time, as others have remarked, let us not assume that 
supervisors are omnipotent and all-seeing. Banks must fail and the disciplines of the market 
must play their proper part, even if, as a result, we as supervisors appear to have to shoulder the 
blame for problems when they occur”.54 A blend of cultural representations and political ideas 
thus interwove to shape new practices of banking regulation, whereby a more liberal 
environment was counterbalanced by a reinforced supervision.  
 
 
3. The making of new rules and norms in banking supervision 
The members of the Basel Committee wrote several reports to the governors between 
1974 and 1988 in order to improve banking supervisory practices. A complete review of its 
activity is not possible in a few pages. However, a few examples can shed light on the role 
played by these experts in shaping the new international financial system. This section examines 
both the influence of the Committee and the role of its members in setting new rules for 
supervisory practices. The question of the influence of the BCBS is complex, because it was 
both direct and indirect, that is, involving official agreements or simply reflecting reciprocal 
influence between member countries. Most of the work of the Committee was about technical 
issues and exchange of ideas, which participated in the creation of a new method for 
international banking supervision. Some achievements of the Committee are already famous, 
such as the Concordat, established in 1975 and made public in 1979,55 or the capital adequacy 
agreement of 1988, which has already received much academic attention.56 Others, such as the 
consolidation of banks' balance sheets for supervisory purposes, have received less attention 
from the part of researchers. The consolidation principle became integrated in the revised 
Concordat of 1983. Taken together, the Concordat and consolidation principle illustrate both 
technical and broader issues addressed by the Committee. They will be briefly explained in 
order to highlight its work until the early 1980s. 
What was called the Concordat from 1979 on was initially a text written by Huib Muller, 
from the Nederlandsche Bank, on the division of responsibilities between G10 authorities in 
international banking supervision. The first meetings of the Basel Committee, in 1975, 
dedicated substantial time to discussing issues of prudential responsibilities of foreign branches 
and subsidiaries. These discussions resulted from the failure of the Israel-British Bank, an 
Israeli bank with a subsidiary in London and which had been involved in fraud, using a Swiss 
bank to hide part of its business.57 In his paper, Huib Muller tried to clarify prudential 
responsibilities, suggesting a scheme to delineate them. Roughly speaking, the control of 
liquidity was mostly left to host authorities, while the supervision of solvency was the prime 
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responsibility of home authorities.58 The text was deliberately vague in order to state broad 
principles and avoid too lengthy negotiations, and was redrafted by the Committee to be send 
as a report to the Governors in October 1975.59 It became public in 1979 after the London 
conference, and revised in 1983 in order to include the consolidation principle and make clear 
that it did not cover lender-of-last-resort issues, a point that had always been too delicate for 
authorities when taking an official position.60 
The nature of the 1975 agreement and its role for the Committee had several dimensions. 
In itself, the agreement was drawing on already existing though not formalised practices of 
banking supervisors. Nordic countries (Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Iceland) had long 
established cooperative practices to supervise their international banks.61 The aim of the 
Concordat was to prevent gaps in banking supervision, making sure that all situations were 
covered by one or several supervisory authorities. In practice, it was difficult to implement, 
because of several obstacles such as lack of information, banking secrecy rules, absence of 
lender of last resort responsibilities, and the diversity of situations in international banking. 
However, the Concordat and its successive refinements may also be seen as a progressive 
formalisation of international cooperation between supervisory administrations. The agreement 
established between authorities formalised a network of supervisors and played a role in 
internationalising national administrations.  
The principle of the consolidation of banks' balance sheets for supervisory purposes is 
an interesting case of circulation between the EEC groupings and the Basel Committee. It was 
a direct consequence of banks' multinationalisation,62 and consisted of taking into account all 
the foreign establishments of a bank, including its foreign subsidiaries, when evaluating its 
liquidity and solvency.63 The aim was both to be more informed of foreign subsidiaries' 
activities and to prevent banks from escaping regulation through subsidiaries established in less 
regulated countries. Legally independent, foreign subsidiaries were until then not included in 
the calculation of solvency ratios and could thus be used to bypass home regulations. At the 
October 1976 meeting, Hugo Coljé, from the Dutch central bank, explained that he was writing 
a paper for the EEC Groupe de Contact on consolidation and suggested also discussing this 
issue at the Basel Committee.64 In fact, the Basel Committee addressed the topic only one year 
later, in October 1977, and most of the initial work was made by the EEC Groupe de Contact.65  
The Basel Committee worked thoroughly on the topic of consolidation in late 1977 and 
1978. When Coljé presented his paper in October 1977, he stressed the challenges of offshore 
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centres for banking supervisors.66 In this, he stated that home authorities had a moral 
responsibility not only to banks' foreign branches, but also to their foreign subsidiaries, and that 
subsidiaries could carry a risk superior to actual participation for parent banks. Countries were 
then at different stages of reflection on the question. The Netherlands and the United States 
were very favourable to the idea, whereas in Japan authorities had only just started to deliberate 
on it. In France, reaction to Coljé's paper had been very positive because it called attention to a 
problem which was still little considered.67 During 1978, most members rapidly agreed on the 
desirability of consolidating banks' balance sheets. Debates centred around the technical details 
and on the importance and implementation of the method. The main technical problem 
concerned what to do with minority participations. Danielsson, a Swedish delegate, explained 
in June 1978 that he was unable to convince his colleagues in Sweden of the desirability of the 
method of consolidation, and therefore was in favour of a report to the governors in order to 
strengthen the idea.68 Consolidation implied heavy technical work on the part of supervisors, 
and was difficult to apply in practice.69 Despite these technical difficulties, the Basel Committee 
members were largely in favour of this technique which was meant to improve international 
banking supervision. They wrote a report advocating this method in 1978, and submitted it to 
the governors in September after several revisions.70 In December, the governors strongly 
endorsed it and invited the Committee to write another report stating progress made in the field 
and giving directives.71  
The second report was sent to the governors on 22nd March 1979.72 This reaffirmed the 
desirability of consolidation for supervisory purposes and called for its implementation. 
Consolidation faced considerable resistance from banks in some cases, notably Switzerland, 
because it revealed the under-capitalisation of several Swiss banks once their foreign 
subsidiaries were taken into account.73 In practice, consolidation could not solve all the issues 
of international supervision, and needed cooperation of foreign authorities in order to obtain 
the necessary information. Some countries needed a change in the legislation in order to 
implement the principle of consolidation.74 On the whole, the exercise showed an effort on the 
part of authorities to think more globally and take into account all the risks taken by 
international banks when evaluating their soundness, but it faced considerable delay with 
banking institutions which were already advanced in their multinational expansion.  
The method of consolidation for supervisory purposes was disseminated both at the G-
10 level and beyond. Within the Group of Ten, implementation of the consolidation's principle 
was very uneven until the early 1980s. The countries who particularly favoured its adoption, 
such as the United States or the Netherlands, applied it quite early.75 Japan reinforced its 
measures in 1978, and Canada extended consolidation to majority participations and important 
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minority participations in 1980. In Germany, the legal framework for consolidation did not exist 
yet in 1981, but was strongly favoured by the Ministry of Finance. Meanwhile, German 
authorities had to rely on a gentlemen's agreement with banks from 1979.76 In France, 
consolidation was possible, but not compulsory, from 1979 on. Outside the G10, the principle 
of consolidation was spread through direct correspondence with other authorities, through the 
G10 governors’ statements, and through the London international conference of July 1979. The 
first report on consolidation was circulated in advance to the guests of the conference and many 
replies were received over the following months. The method of consolidation was further 
supported by the governors in a press communiqué of April 1980, where they stressed the 
importance of the work of the Basel Committee in this field. 
At that point the governors’ communiqué triggered an active agenda on the part of 
European institutions, in order to issue a new directive.77 The idea behind this was part of a 
more ambitious project initiated by the 1977 directive on the coordination of banking 
regulations in member states. The Commission wished to make consolidation compulsory in 
all member states but also to harmonise periodical returns submitted by banks to authorities.78 
Consolidation was therefore included in a broader framework, including the improvement of 
the circulation of information between prudential authorities in member states, simplification 
of banks' declarations, and the harmonisation of definitions of accounting categories. Several 
projects were subsequently submitted by the Commission to the Banking Advisory Committee 
from 1980 on. The discussion between the Commission, the Advisory Committee and the 
Groupe de Contact lasted two years, until the directive was eventually issued in 1983.79 Thus, 
a method of banking supervision initially put forward by a European expert committee (the 
EEC Groupe de Contact), was then discussed and endorsed by the Basel Committee and then 
went back to the EEC level. To some extent, the principle of consolidation was a simple 
administrative practice, but its use increased considerably through the influence of the Basel 
Committee, and its spread highlighted a global turn from the part of the authorities. This case 
study illustrates the international circulation and construction of supervisory practices through 
the Committee.  
 
 
As a conclusion, this paper has showed how institution building, elites, and networks 
played a combined role in the transformation of the post-Bretton Woods financial system. If the 
context was favourable to the reinforcement of specific international committees such as the 
BCBS, its members played a crucial role in devising new rules for banking supervision and 
banking practices. This membership was quite diverse: some members were much more 
influential or had a more international career than others. The various networks they were part 
of, such as international committees, other international organisations, or national institutions, 
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highlight the density of the regulatory field at the turn of the global era. Furthermore, the BCBS 
as a group gained much symbolic capital over the period considered, and evolved from a club 
to an institution. Its visibility and respectability increased over time, and so did its legitimacy. 
At the same time, the profession of banking supervision was on the rise and in many ways the 
BCBS looked like a body to reinforce it, in front of on-going liberalisation of the banking sector. 
As individuals, members of the BCBS were the elite of the banking supervisors. Its 
achievements were not just simple “agreements” between them, but also collective 
constructions involving intellectual reflection and cultural representations of the market and of 
the supervisory role. Their influence culminated in the drawing of the first international 
standard in banking regulation, the capital adequacy agreement of 1988. 
More generally, this chapter sheds light on the process by which banking supervision 
became international and gained importance within the broader field of regulation, thereby 
helping us understand better some aspects of the origins of the recent Global Financial Crisis. 
Banking supervision, which was supposed to control banks’ daily activities, became an 
increasingly important part of regulation which was the overall framework within which banks 
operated. Its internationalisation and its increasing focus on capital adequacy issues 
transformed its role. However, as we have seen from the cases of offshore centres or other non 
G10 countries, gaps in banking supervision could never be completely filled. Furthermore, 
regulatory power was not entirely in the hands of supervisors. Concerns about national 
competitiveness and financial liberalisation, which are beyond the scope of this study, played 
an important role, and involved many other actors than just supervisors. Nonetheless, the roots 
of the Global Financial Crisis are best understood by considering the new regulatory framework 
established in the aftermath of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system, a change which is 













Appendix 1: name and background of BCBS members’ mentioned in text 
 
 




1 Pierre André Belgium National Bank of Belgium, 1945-1981.  
1968 : Chief of Foreign Department 




Belgium  National Bank of Belgium, 1941-1984.  




Belgium National Bank of Belgium, 1941-1982.  
1979-1980 : Head of Foreign Department 
1980 : Deputy Director. 





Belgium National Bank of Belgium, 1971-2014. 
1973 : International Agreements Department. 
1988 : Inspector General. 
Member of several international committees. 
Education : philosophy, law, economics 
1984-1995 
5 Pierre Fanet France Banque de France from 1950 to retirement in 
1985. General Inspector from 1976 on.  




France Banque de France from 1945 to retirement in 
1983. Seconded to the IMF from 1955 to 1958, 
and to the Statistical Office of the European 
Communities from 1962 to 1963. Director of 
foreign services.  




France Banque de France and French Banking 
Commission, seconded to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York in 1974-1975. 
Education : law, economics. 
1976-1987 
8 Jean Pierre 
Fevre 
France Banque de France from 1964 to retirement in 
2001 (inspection). Seconded to the European 
Commission from 1989 to 1997. 
Education : HEC, Institut d'Etude Politique de 
Paris 
1978-1986 
9 André Icard France Banque de France and French Banking 
Commission, seconded to the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York. 
Banque Française du Commerce extérieur. 





France Banque de France, inspection (1968-1976), 
foreign services (1976-1985), seconded to 
New York in 1978-1979. 
Executive Director of various services at the 
Banque de France. 
Executive Director of various French overseas 
departments institutions. 





France Banque de France and French banking 
commission 1951-1990, economic studies, and 
deputy secretary general of the French 
Banking Commisssion (1987-1990). 





Germany German Federal Banking Supervision Office. 
Education : Law, economics, history 
1975-1990 
13 Carlo Santini Italy Banca d'Italia, 1961-2000. 
Economic Studies Department. 
Private carreer from 2000 on. 




Italy Banca d'Italia, 1967-1986. 
Legal advice. 
Private career from 1989 on. 




Italy Banca d'Italia 
Head of International research,  
Five years secondment to the IMF. 
Member of several European committees. 
Education : economics and business 




Italy Banca d'Italia, 1970 
Research Department. 
1985 : Regulations and Supervision 
Department. 
1993 : Head of Banking Supervision 
Department. 
Member of several European and international 
committees. 





Japan Bank of Japan, 1962.  
1972-1975 : Representative in the Americas 
1975 : Alternative Executive Director for 
Japan, IMF. 
1976 : seconded to the Banking Bureau, 
Ministry of Finance. 
1978 : Manager, International Department. 
Education : law, economics (Wharton School 




Japan 1976-1979 : economist at the OECD 
1979-1985 : various positions at the Ministry 
of Finance.  





Luxembourg Commissariat au contrôle des banques, 1959-
1977. 
1968-1976 : commissioner. 
1977 : private carreer at the Banque 
Internationale du Luxembourg.  
Member of many EEC and international 
groupings. 
Education : law. 
1975-1975 
20 Pierre Jaans Luxembourg Deutsche Bundesbank, 1962-1972. 
Secretariat of the OECD, 1972-1974. 
Commissariat au contrôle des banques, from 
1975 on.  
Member of several EEC groupings. 
Education : economics. 
1975 
21 Jean Nicolas 
Schaus 
Luxembourg 1966-1969 : lawyer. 
Commissariat au contrôle des banques, 1969-
1983. 
Manager of the Institut Monétaire 
Luxembourgeois, 1983-1995. 
Member of the EEC Banking Advisory 
Committee. 
Education : law. 
1978-1989 
22 Huib Muller Netherlands Nederlandsche Bank, 1964-1991.  
Supervisory Department, 1968. 
Alternative Deputy Director, 1973-1976. 
Then member of the Bank's governing board, 
with a special brief for prudential supervision. 
1977-1985 : member, then chairman, of the 
EEC Banking Advisory Committee. 













Deputy Executive Director in charge of 
banking supervision, 1986-1992. 
After 2001 : private carreer at 
PricewaterhouseCoopers. 
Member of EEC Banking Advisory 




Sweden Riskbank, 1976-1997 (then Ministry of 
Finance).  
Economist, department manager at the 
international department, monetary and 
exchange policy department. 





Switzerland 1957-1980 : Federal Department of Finance 
1980 : Swiss Federal Banking Commission. 




Switzerland Swiss Federal Banking Commission, secretary, 
1976-1986. 
1990-1993 : Banca del Gottardo. 
Education : law. 
1976-1986 
27 Paul Ehrsam Switzerland Federal Department of Finance, before 1967. 
Swiss National Bank, 1967-1970. 
Swiss Federal Banking Commission, from 
1976 on.  




Switzerland Swiss Federal Banking Commission : 
Head of legal service (1981-1985), Vice 
Director (1986-1987), Deputy Director (1988-
1995), Director (1996-2008). 
Member of Working Party 3, IOSCO. 
Education : law, economics. 
1986-1995 
29 Peter Klauser Switzerland Lawyer 
Swiss National Bank from 1974 on. 
Legal Service Department,  
study period at the Federal Reserve Bank of 
New York (1981), Deputy Head of 
Department I, in charge of the Legal and 
Administrative Division (1982).  
After 1997 : private carreer at Orell Fussli 
Holding. 
Education : law. 
1986-1995 
30 Kurt Hauri Switzerland Swiss Federal Banking Commission. 
President, 1996-2000. 







Bank of England, 1947-1990. 
Seconded to the International Monetary Fund, 
1955-1958.  
1975-1977 
Head of Banking Supervision, 1974-1976.  
Executive Director, 1974-1984.  
Deputy governor, 1986-1990. 
Education : Public school, Oxford. 
32 Galpin United 
Kingdom 
Bank of England, 1952-1988. 
Deputy Chief Cashier, Banking and Money 
Market Supervision, 1974-1978. 
After 1988 : private carreer at Standard 
Chartered. 
Education : Haileybury and imperial college 
service. 
1975-1977 
33 Derrick Byatt United 
Kingdom 
Bank of England, 1949-1986. 
Seconded to the BIS, 1954-1955,  
Chief Cashier at the Bank of Zambia, 1964-
1967. 
Various positions in Foreign Exchange 
Division. 







Bank of England, 1961-1994. 
Secondment to the IMF, 1964. 
Deputy Chief Cashier, 1973-1980. 
Education : Cambridge. 
1977-1980 






Bank of England, 1955-1988. 
Seconded to the Bank for International 
Settlements, 1961-1965. 
Head of Banking Supervision, 1976. 
Associate Director, 1982-1988. 
Education : Oxford. 
1977-1988 
36 Roger Barnes United 
Kingdom 
Bank of England, 1961-1993. 
Head of Banking Supervision, 1988-1993. 
After 1993 : private carreer at Hambros Bank 
Ltd. 
Education : Oxford. 
1980-1993 





Bank of England, 1953-1989. 
Seconded to the Bank of Mauritius, 1970-
1972. 
Seconded to Hong Kong Government, 1985-
1989. 
Secretary for Monetary Affairs, Hong Kong 
Government, 1989-1993. 
Education : Haileybury College. 
1981-1993 
38 Brian Quinn United 
Kingdom 
Economist at the IMF, 1964-1970 . 
Bank of England, 1970-1996. 
Assistant Director, Banking Supervision 
(1982-1986), Head of Banking Supervision 
(1986-1988). 






Bank of England, joined in 1967. 
Period as Economist in the Central Banking 
Service, IMF. 
Seconded to the Isle of Man Government, 
1982.  
Seconded to the Hong Kong Government as 
Advisor to the Hong Kong Banking 
Commissioner, 1984-1986. 
Deputy Head of Banking Supervision, 1990-
1993. 
Several international committees. 
Education : economics. 
1987-1993 
40 Robert F. 
Gemmill 
USA Board of Governors the Federal Reserve,  
Adviser in the Division of International 
Finance.  
Education : PhD, Harvard University. 
1975-1978 
41 David Willey USA Federal Reserve Bank of New York, from 
1964 on.  
1972 : Vice president, assigned to the loans 
and credits function. 
Has worked at Morgan Stanley. 





USA Career in private sector (Smith Barney & Co., 
E.M. Warburg Pincus & Co) from 1956 to 
1975.  
Comptroller of the Currency from 1977 to 
1981.  
Then came back to private sector : Warburg, 
Paribas Becker, Becker Paribas Incorporated, 
and Merrill Lynch. 
Education : economics, law. 
1978-1980 
43 Robert Bench USA Office of the Comptroller of the Currency.  
Assistant chief national bank examiner, then 
Deputy Comptroller of the Currency. 
Joined Price Waterhouse's Financial Services 
Practice after twenty-two years at the OCC. 
Education : Boston and Harvard Universities. 
1978-1984 
44 Sam Cross USA Prior to 1974 : deputy assistant treasury 
secretary for International Monetary and 
Investment Affairs 
1974-1981 : executive director at the IMF. 
1975-1980 : special assistant to the secretary 
of the Treasury. 
1981 : Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 
Head of Foreign Exchanges and Foreign 
Relations, then Vice president. 
Education : BS and MS, University of 
Tennessee. 
1979-1982 
45 Robert Clarke USA Joined the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency after a career in a law firm's banking 
section. 
1985: Comptroller of the Currency. 




USA Various positions in the private sector before 
joining the Office of the Comptroller of the 
Currency.  
1981: Comptroller of the Currency.  




USA Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, 
then career in the private sector. 








Bank of England, joined in 1951. 
1954 to 1990 : seconded to the BIS.  
Secretariat of the Group of Ten. 
Head of BIS' economic and monetary 
department. 







Austria BIS, joined in 1963.  









Bank of England, joined in 1964.  
BIS, 1975-2007. 
Seconded in 1975 at the BIS.  
Education : Eton, MA in economics, Saint 
Andrews University. 
1978-1997 
 
